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“喆學(xué)（99）：精讀博士論文
《考慮公平偏好的競爭型綠色供應(yīng)鏈定價(jià)決策和動(dòng)態(tài)協(xié)調(diào)研究》
考慮公平關(guān)切和商譽(yù)的
競爭型綠色供應(yīng)鏈動(dòng)態(tài)協(xié)調(diào)研究(2)”
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Today,theeditorbringsthe
"Zhexue(99):Intensivereadingofdoctoraldissertation
"Researchonpricingdecisionanddynamiccoordinationofcompetitivegreensupplychainconsideringfairnesspreference"
Researchondynamiccoordinationofcompetitive
greensupplychainconsideringfairnessconcernsandgoodwill(2)"
Welcometovisit!
本期推文將從思維導(dǎo)圖,、精讀內(nèi)容、知識(shí)補(bǔ)充三個(gè)方面介紹精讀博士論文《考慮公平偏好的競爭型綠色供應(yīng)鏈定價(jià)決策和動(dòng)態(tài)協(xié)調(diào)研究》考慮公平關(guān)切和商譽(yù)的競爭型綠色供應(yīng)鏈動(dòng)態(tài)協(xié)調(diào)研究,。
Thisissueoftweetswillintroducetheintensivereadingdoctoraldissertation"ResearchonPricingDecisionsandDynamicCoordinationofCompetitiveGreenSupplyChainsConsideringFairnessPreferences"fromthreeaspects:mindmap,intensivereadingcontent,andknowledgesupplement.Researchondynamiccoordinationofcompetitivegreensupplychainsconsideringfairnessconcernsandgoodwill.
一,、思維導(dǎo)圖（MindMaps）
二、精讀內(nèi)容（Intensivereadingcontent
(1)公平關(guān)切框架下的供應(yīng)鏈動(dòng)態(tài)協(xié)調(diào)(Dynamiccoordinationofsupplychainsundertheframeworkoffairnessconcerns)
1.集中式?jīng)Q策(Centralizeddecisionmaking)
文中首先定義了供應(yīng)鏈整體利潤最大化的決策目標(biāo)函數(shù),。接著,，命題6-4提出了在有零售商競爭的集中式?jīng)Q策環(huán)境下，制造商的綠色創(chuàng)新投入水平,、零售商的銷售努力水平和零售價(jià)格的均衡策略,。命題6-5則描述了產(chǎn)品綠色度和商譽(yù)的最優(yōu)變化軌跡，并給出了相應(yīng)的數(shù)學(xué)表達(dá)式,。
Thepaperfirstdefinesthedecisionobjectivefunctionofmaximizingtheoverallprofitofthesupplychain.Then,Proposition6-4proposestheequilibriumstrategyofthemanufacturer'sgreeninnovationinputlevel,theretailer'ssaleseffortlevelandtheretailpriceinacentralizeddecision-makingenvironmentwithretailercompetition.Proposition6-5describestheoptimalchangetrajectoryofproductgreennessandgoodwill,andgivesthecorrespondingmathematicalexpression.
在集中式?jīng)Q策模式下,，供應(yīng)鏈的綠色創(chuàng)新和銷售努力受消費(fèi)者偏好、技術(shù)創(chuàng)新,、產(chǎn)品綠色度和競爭強(qiáng)度正向影響,，而受衰退率、成本和貼現(xiàn)率負(fù)向影響,。零售商考慮公平關(guān)切時(shí),，這些積極性可能下降。研究提供了一個(gè)最優(yōu)長期利潤函數(shù),，為供應(yīng)鏈管理決策提供理論支持,。
Underthecentralizeddecision-makingmodel,thegreeninnovationandsaleseffortsofthesupplychainarepositivelyaffectedbyconsumerpreferences,technologicalinnovation,productgreennessandcompetitionintensity,andnegativelyaffectedbythedeclinerate,costanddiscountrate.Whenretailersconsiderfairnessconcerns,thesemotivationsmaydecline.Thestudyprovidesanoptimallong-termprofitfunction,providingtheoreticalsupportforsupplychainmanagementdecisions.
2.雙向成本分擔(dān)契約下的決策(Decision-makingunderatwo-waycost-sharingcontract)
集中決策提升綠色供應(yīng)鏈創(chuàng)新與銷售，但現(xiàn)實(shí)中企業(yè)獨(dú)立性使得其難以實(shí)施,。通過雙向成本分擔(dān)契約,，制造商與零售商共同承擔(dān)成本，促進(jìn)合作,，實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào),。
Centralizeddecision-makingcanimprovegreensupplychaininnovationandsales,butinreality,theindependenceofenterprisesmakesitdifficulttoimplement.Throughatwo-waycost-sharingcontract,manufacturersandretailerssharecosts,promotecooperation,andachievesupplychaincoordination.
在模型S中，制造商對(duì)零售商銷售成本的分擔(dān)比例與零售商間的競爭水平正相關(guān),，與公平關(guān)切程度負(fù)相關(guān),；零售商對(duì)制造商綠色創(chuàng)新成本的分擔(dān)比例則與競爭水平負(fù)相關(guān)，與公平關(guān)切程度正相關(guān),。零售商對(duì)公平的高關(guān)注降低了制造商分擔(dān)銷售成本的意愿，但增加了零售商分擔(dān)綠色創(chuàng)新成本的意愿,，因?yàn)楣疥P(guān)切導(dǎo)致制造商利益流失,，而零售商為安撫制造商愿意承擔(dān)更多成本。激烈的零售商競爭減少了他們分擔(dān)綠色創(chuàng)新成本的意愿,，而制造商為供應(yīng)鏈穩(wěn)定可能承擔(dān)更多銷售成本,。
InmodelS,theproportionofsalescostssharedbymanufacturerswithretailersispositivelycorrelatedwiththelevelofcompetitionamongretailersandnegativelycorrelatedwiththedegreeoffairnessconcern;theproportionofgreeninnovationcostssharedbyretailerswithmanufacturersisnegativelycorrelatedwiththelevelofcompetitionandpositivelycorrelatedwiththedegreeoffairnessconcern.Retailers'highconcernforfairnessreducesmanufacturers'willingnesstosharesalescosts,butincreasestheirwillingnesstosharegreeninnovationcosts,becausefairnessconcernsleadtothelossofmanufacturers'interests,andretailersarewillingtobearmorecoststoappeasemanufacturers.Fiercecompetitionamongretailersreducestheirwillingnesstosharegreeninnovationcosts,whilemanufacturersmaybearmoresalescostsforsupplychainstability.
推論6-10指出,，零售商分擔(dān)的綠色創(chuàng)新成本應(yīng)適度，以保持雙向成本分擔(dān)契約的優(yōu)勢(shì),。零售商的銷售努力受其競爭強(qiáng)度,、制造商分擔(dān)比例和公平關(guān)切水平的共同影響。制造商需綜合考慮零售商的實(shí)際情況,，制定合理的分擔(dān)比例,，以確保契約的有效性和可行性。
Corollary6-10indicatesthatthegreeninnovationcostssharedbyretailersshouldbemoderatetomaintaintheadvantagesofthetwo-waycostsharingcontract.Retailers’saleseffortsarejointlyaffectedbytheircompetitiveintensity,themanufacturer’sshareratio,andtheleveloffairnessconcern.Manufacturersneedtocomprehensivelyconsidertheactualsituationofretailersandformulateareasonableshareratiotoensuretheeffectivenessandfeasibilityofthecontract.
最后得出,，產(chǎn)品綠色度和商譽(yù)的最優(yōu)軌跡和制造商和供應(yīng)鏈的長期利潤函數(shù)以及零售商的長期公平效用函數(shù),。
Finally,theoptimaltrajectoryofproductgreennessandgoodwill,thelong-termprofitfunctionofmanufacturersandsupplychains,andthelong-termfairutilityfunctionofretailersareobtained.
(2)算例分析(CaseAnalysis)
1.各決策下的均衡結(jié)果比較(各決策下的均衡結(jié)果比較)
與集中式?jīng)Q策模型C相比，模型N,、F和S中制造商的綠色創(chuàng)新投入,、零售商的銷售努力、產(chǎn)品綠色度,、綠色商譽(yù)和供應(yīng)鏈利潤均下降,。模型F和S的批發(fā)價(jià)格略低于模型N。零售商的公平關(guān)切對(duì)綠色產(chǎn)品發(fā)展不利,，但通過雙向成本分擔(dān)契約,，可提升綠色創(chuàng)新和銷售努力，增加綠色消費(fèi)者吸引,，提高銷（略）場(chǎng),，從而增加制造商、零售商和供應(yīng)鏈的利潤,，對(duì)綠色經(jīng)濟(jì)有積極影響,。
Comparedwiththecentralizeddecision-makingmodelC,thegreeninnovationinputofmanufacturers,thesaleseffortsofretailers,thegreennessofproducts,thegreengoodwillandtheprofitsofthesupplychaininmodelsN,（略）,butthroughthetwo-waycost-sharingcontract,greeninnovationandsaleseffortscanbeimproved,theattractionofgreenconsumerscanbeincreased,andsalesandmarketscanbeincreased,therebyincreasingtheprofitsofmanufacturers,retailersandsupplychains,whichhasapositiveimpactonthegreeneconomy.
2.產(chǎn)品綠色度和商譽(yù)軌跡分析(Analysisofproductgreennessandgoodwilltrajectory)
產(chǎn)品綠色度隨時(shí)間增加而提高，最終趨于穩(wěn)定,。在零售商公平關(guān)切情況下,，產(chǎn)品綠色度最低；在雙向成本分擔(dān)契約下,，產(chǎn)品綠色度最高,；公平中性情況下居中。這表明零售商的公平關(guān)切可能降低產(chǎn)品綠色度,，而合適的契約能提升綠色度,，促進(jìn)（略）場(chǎng)和供應(yīng)鏈的可持續(xù)性。
Thegreennessofproductsincreasesovertimeandeventuallystabilizes.Whenretailershavefairnessconcerns,thegreennessofproductsisthelowest;underatwo-waycost-sharingcontract,thegreennessofproductsisthehighest;andunderafairandneutralsituation,theproductisinthemiddle.Thisshowsthatretailers'fairnessconcernsmayreducethegreennessofproducts,whileappropriatecontractscanimprovegreennessandpromotethesustainabilityofgreenmarketsandsupplychains.
綠色商譽(yù)隨時(shí)間增長而趨于穩(wěn)定,，但不同決策下穩(wěn)態(tài)值差異顯著,。公平關(guān)切情形下綠色商譽(yù)較低，而雙向成本分擔(dān)契約能顯著提升綠色商譽(yù)。綠色商譽(yù)受多種因素影響,，包括銷售努力,、綠色創(chuàng)新投入、衰減率等,。零售商的公平傾向可能降低產(chǎn)品綠色屬性,，對(duì)（略）場(chǎng)發(fā)展不利。然而,，雙向成本分擔(dān)契約有助于（略）場(chǎng)損失,，促進(jìn)綠色經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展，強(qiáng)調(diào)供應(yīng)鏈合作的重要性,。
Greengoodwilltendstobestableovertime,butthesteady-statevaluesunderdifferentdecisionsvarysignificantly.Greengoodwillislowerunderthefairnessconcernscenario,whilethetwo-waycost-sharingcontractcansignificantlyimprovegreengoodwill.Greengoodwillisaffectedbymanyfactors,includingsalesefforts,greeninnovationinvestment,anddecayrate.Retailers'fairnesstendencymayreducethegreenattributesofproductsandbedetrimentaltothedevelopmentofthegreenmarket.However,two-waycost-sharingcontractscanhelpavoidmarketlosses,promotegreeneconomicdevelopment,andemphasizetheimportanceofsupplychaincooperation.
3.制造商和零售商利潤軌跡分析(Analysisofprofittrajectoriesofmanufacturersandretailers)
制造商利潤隨時(shí)間趨于穩(wěn)定,，但在公平關(guān)切情形下較低，而在雙向成本分擔(dān)契約下最高,，表明零售商的公平關(guān)切可能降低制造商利潤,，而雙向成本分擔(dān)契約能顯著提升利潤。
Manufacturerprofitstendtobestableovertime,butarelowerinthefairnessconcernscenarioandhighestunderthetwo-waycost-sharingcontract,indicatingthatretailers’fairnessconcernsmayreducemanufacturerprofits,whiletwo-waycost-sharingcontractscansignificantlyincreaseprofits.
零售商在公平關(guān)切情形下的利潤增長較小,，而在雙向成本分擔(dān)契約和公平中性情形下,，利潤隨時(shí)間顯著增加。盡管雙向成本分擔(dān)契約對(duì)零售商利潤增長幅度較小,，但當(dāng)時(shí)間超過2.5時(shí),，關(guān)注公平問題的零售商能獲得更高利潤。
Theretailer'sprofitgrowthissmallerinthefairnessconcernscenario,whileprofitsincreasesignificantlyovertimeinthetwo-waycost-sharingcontractandfairnessneutralityscenarios.Althoughthetwo-waycost-sharingcontracthasasmallimpactontheretailer'sprofitincrease,whenthetimeexceeds2.5,retailerswhopayattentiontofairnessissuescanobtainhigherprofits.
雙向成本分擔(dān)契約對(duì)制造商績效提升顯著,，但可能影響公平關(guān)切零售商的積極性,。因此，制造商和零售商需協(xié)商合理的分擔(dān)比例,，以實(shí)現(xiàn)合作共贏,，促進(jìn)綠色供應(yīng)鏈發(fā)展。
Two-waycost-sharingcontractssignificantlyimprovemanufacturerperformance,butmayaffecttheenthusiasmoffairness-concernedretailers.Therefore,manufacturersandretailersneedtonegotiateareasonablesharingratiotoachievewin-wincooperationandpromotethedevelopmentofagreensupplychain.
4.靈敏度分析(Sensitivityanalysis)
在綠色經(jīng)濟(jì)背景下,，雙向成本分擔(dān)契約顯著提升了制造商和供應(yīng)鏈的總利潤,，增強(qiáng)了對(duì)消費(fèi)者綠色偏好的敏感性。盡管零售商利潤增幅較小,，但公平關(guān)切行為對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈有顯著影響,，初期可能降低效用，長期則可通過與制造商合作提升,。制造商需平衡零售商的公平關(guān)切與利潤最大化,，合理分擔(dān)成本，避免損失,，這為綠色供應(yīng)鏈定價(jià)決策提供了理論依據(jù),。
Inthecontextofgreeneconomy,two-waycost-sharingcontractssignificantlyimprovethetotalprofitsofmanufacturersandsupplychainsandenhancethesensitivitytoconsumers'greenpreferences.Althoughtheincreaseinretailers’profitsissmall,fairness-concernedbehaviorshaveasignificantimpactonthesupplychain,whichmayreduceutilityintheearlystagesbutcanbeimprovedinthelongtermthroughcooperationwithmanufacturers.Manufacturersneedtobalanceretailers'fairnessconcernswithprofitmaximization,reasonablysharecostsandavoidlosses,whichprovidesatheoreticalbasisforgreensupplychainpricingdecisions.
三,、知識(shí)補(bǔ)充（Knowledgesupplement）
綠色偏好對(duì)消費(fèi)者購買行為的影響主要體現(xiàn)在以下幾個(gè)方面：
Theimpactofgreenpreferenceonconsumerpurchasingbehaviorismainlyreflectedinthefollowingaspects:
1.提升購買意愿：消費(fèi)者對(duì)環(huán)保和可持續(xù)發(fā)展的關(guān)注增加,，使得他們更傾向于購買綠色產(chǎn)品,。
1.Increasedwillingnesstobuy:Consumers'increasedattentiontoenvironmentalprotectionandsustainabledevelopmentmakesthemmoreinclinedtobuygreenproducts.
2.知識(shí)影響：消費(fèi)者的綠色知識(shí)，包括環(huán)境知識(shí),、可持續(xù)發(fā)展知識(shí),、產(chǎn)品知識(shí)和生態(tài)標(biāo)簽知識(shí)，能夠提高他們對(duì)綠色產(chǎn)品的認(rèn)知,，從而促進(jìn)購買意愿,。
2.Knowledgeimpact:Consumers'greenknowledge,includingenvironmentalknowledge,sustainabledevelopmentknowledge,productknowledgeandeco-labelknowledge,canimprovetheirunderstandingofgreenproducts,therebypromotingpurchasingintention.
3.資源稀缺性：資源稀缺可能會(huì)降低消費(fèi)者對(duì)綠色產(chǎn)品的購買意愿，因?yàn)檫@類消費(fèi)者在購買決策時(shí)可能更關(guān)注價(jià)格和基本需求,。
3.Resourcescarcity:Resourcescarcitymayreduceconsumers'willingnesstobuygreenproductsbecausesuchconsumersmaypaymoreattentiontopriceandbasicneedswhenmakingpurchasingdecisions.
4.經(jīng)濟(jì)流動(dòng)性：感知經(jīng)濟(jì)流動(dòng)性可以緩解資源稀缺帶來的心理威脅,，提高消費(fèi)者對(duì)綠色產(chǎn)品的購買信心。
4.Economicliquidity:Perceivedeconomicliquiditycanalleviatethepsychologicalthreatbroughtbyresourcescarcityandincreaseconsumers'confidenceinbuyinggreenproducts.
5.供應(yīng)鏈利潤：（略）中綠色投資的效益,，從而提升整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈的利潤,。
5.Supplychainprofit:Consumers'greenpreferencecanenhancethebenefitsofgreeninvestmentinthesupplychainsystem,therebyincreasingtheprofitoftheentiresupplychain.
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翻譯：谷歌翻譯
參考資料：谷歌,、ChatGPT
參考文獻(xiàn)：葛根哈斯.考慮公平偏好的競爭型綠色供應(yīng)鏈定價(jià)決策和動(dòng)態(tài)協(xié)調(diào)研究[D].北京科技大學(xué),2023.
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